Swine Workers and Swine Influenza Virus Infections by Gray, Gregory C. et al.
In 2004, 803 rural Iowans from the Agricultural Health 
Study were enrolled in a 2-year prospective study of zoo-
notic inﬂ  uenza transmission. Demographic and occupational 
exposure data from enrollment, 12-month, and 24-month 
follow-up encounters were examined for association with 
evidence of previous and incident inﬂ  uenza  virus  infec-
tions. When proportional odds modeling with multivariable 
adjustment was used, upon enrollment, swine-exposed par-
ticipants (odds ratio [OR] 54.9, 95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 
13.0–232.6) and their nonswine-exposed spouses (OR 28.2, 
95% CI 6.1–130.1) were found to have an increased odds 
of elevated antibody level to swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus 
compared with 79 nonexposed University of Iowa person-
nel. Further evidence of occupational swine inﬂ  uenza virus 
infections was observed through self-reported inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness data, comparisons of enrollment and follow-up serum 
samples, and the isolation of a reassortant swine inﬂ  uenza 
(H1N1) virus from an ill swine farmer. Study data suggest that 
swine workers and their nonswine-exposed spouses are at 
increased risk of zoonotic inﬂ  uenza virus infections.
S
ince 1997, numerous instances of avian inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus infection have been documented in humans (1). 
The latest of such viruses, strains of subtype H5N1, have 
rapidly spread among domestic bird species across several 
continents and caused disease in >330 humans since 2003 
(2). Like the inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) viruses that are circulating 
today, a highly virulent avian virus subtype, H1N1, was 
responsible for the 1918–1919 pandemic. Coincident with 
the human pandemic, this virus also infected swine, caused 
large-scale epizootics of swine respiratory disease in the 
midwestern United States, and established itself among 
pigs as the “classical” swine inﬂ  uenza virus lineage of 
inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) viruses (3,4). It also apparently moved 
from swine to humans, causing illness among farmers (3). 
Anticipating that the next pandemic virus may similarly be 
readily transmitted among and between pigs and humans, 
we sought to prospectively study swine workers for risk 
factors for swine inﬂ  uenza virus infection.
Methods
Study Population
After institutional review board approval, participants 
were recruited from the 89,658-person Agricultural Health 
Study (AHS) cohort (5) by using an informed consent pro-
cess. The cohort, ﬁ  rst assembled from 1993 through 1997, 
comprises primarily private pesticide applicators (predomi-
nately farmers) and their spouses living in Iowa and North 
Carolina. Through a stratiﬁ  ed sampling scheme, partici-
pants living in Iowa were selected by previously reported 
exposures to swine or poultry, age group, sex, and proxim-
ity to the University of Iowa in Iowa City. Nonswine- and 
nonpoultry-exposed potential participants were similarly 
selected. 
Potential AHS participants and their spouses were 
screened by telephone interviews and veriﬁ  ed to be with-
out immunocompromised conditions and without a his-
tory of accidental injection with swine inﬂ  uenza vaccines. 
They were then invited to participate in a 2-year prospec-
tive study of zoonotic inﬂ  uenza transmission. Enrollments 
were made through personal interviews held in 29 of the 
99 counties in Iowa during the fall of 2004. After informed 
consent was obtained, each participant completed a ques-
tionnaire and permitted serum sample collection. Swine 
exposure was assessed by the participant’s response to the 
enrollment question: “How many years have you worked 
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in swine production?” Participants who answered “never” 
were classiﬁ  ed as nonexposed. Follow-up visits with simi-
lar questionnaires and phlebotomy were scheduled at 12 
and 24 months. Upon enrollment and at 12 months, par-
ticipants were given a ﬁ  rst-class US Postal Service–ready 
kit with detailed instructions to complete another question-
naire and self-collect gargle and nasal swab specimens 
within 96 h of symptom onset if they met a case deﬁ  nition 
of inﬂ  uenza-like illness (fever >38°C and a cough or sore 
throat). The kit contained a freezer block that participants 
were asked to insert into the preaddressed shipping box be-
fore dropping off specimens and questionnaires with the 
US Postal Service. The US post ofﬁ  ce near the University 
of Iowa laboratory kept these boxes refrigerated until the 
study team picked them up on regular work days.
Data and serum samples from nonagricultural health 
study controls from a concurrent cross-sectional study 
(6) were included in population comparisons at enroll-
ment. Study controls were generally healthy University of 
Iowa students, staff, and faculty who denied having swine 
or poultry exposures. They were not studied at 12 and 24 
months after enrollment. 
Laboratory Methods
Specimens
Gargle and swab specimens were transported to the 
University of Iowa by the US Postal Service in Micro Test 
M4RT Viral Transport Media (Remel, Inc., Lenexa, KS, 
USA) and preserved at –80°C. These specimens were stud-
ied with both culture in MDCK cells and R-Mix FreshCells 
(Diagnostic Hybrids, Inc., Athens, OH, USA) and with mo-
lecular techniques.
Hemagglutination-Inhibition (HI) Assay
Per our previous reports (6,7), serum samples were 
tested by using Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) HI assay protocol against 4 isolates of recently 
circulating swine and human inﬂ  uenza A viruses: A/swine/
WI/238/97 (H1N1), A/swine/WI/R33F/2001 (H1N2), A/
New Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1), and A/Panama/2007/99 
(H3N2). Swine virus isolates were selected and provided 
by one of the authors (C.O.). A/swine/WI/238/97 (H1N1) is 
a classic swine (H1N1) virus (8). A/swine/WI/R33F/2001 
(H1N2) is representative of reassortant (H1N2) viruses with 
classic swine virus HA, M, NP, and NS genes, human virus 
NA and PB1 genes, and avian virus PA and PB2 genes that 
ﬁ  rst appeared among US pigs in 1999 (9,10). 
The human viral strains and the A/swine/WI/238/97 
swine strain were grown in embryonated chicken eggs; the 
A/swine/WI/R33F/2001 strain was grown in MDCK cells. 
Serum samples were pretreated with receptor destroying 
enzyme per CDC protocol. Prior to serum HI testing for the 
human strains, samples were hemabsorbed with guinea pig 
erythrocytes. A second aliquot of receptor-destroying en-
zyme-treated serum was hemabsorbed with turkey erythro-
cytes before HI testing of the swine strains. Titer results are 
reported as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum 
that inhibited virus-induced hemagglutination of a 0.65% 
(guinea pig) or 0.50% (turkey) solution of erythrocytes. 
Molecular Studies
Real-time Reverse Transcription–PCR (RT-PCR)
RNA was extracted from 140 μL of each nasal swab 
and gargle sample using a QIAamp viral RNA extraction 
kit (QIAGEN Inc., Valencia, CA, USA) and screened by 
using a proprietary real-time RT-PCR protocol developed 
and provided by CDC. CDC’s protocol is designed to ﬁ  rst 
screen for inﬂ  uenza A, and then, through separate reac-
tions, to rapidly determine inﬂ  uenza HA subtype. iScript 
One-Step RT-PCR Kit for Probes (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA, 
USA) and the iQ Real-Time PCR Detection System (Bio-
Rad) were used on a Bio-Rad iCycler real-time PCR plat-
form for the real-time RT-PCR. Negative template controls 
and positive controls were included on each run. The hu-
man RNase P gene served as an internal control for human 
RNA. Clinical samples with negative results for the RNAse 
P gene were repeated. Samples positive by real-time RT-
PCR for inﬂ  uenza A were further studied with RT-PCR and 
cDNA sequencing for phylogenetic analyses to conﬁ  rm 
subtype and, in some cases, for further genotypic analyses, 
using previously described techniques and primers (9–14).
Cross-reactivity and Reliability
As we had previously identiﬁ   ed partial serologic 
cross-reactivity between swine and human viral strains of 
the same hemagglutinin types (6), we adjusted for this po-
tential confounding in each of the risk factor analyses by 
including human serologic results in the models. Regarding 
laboratory assay reliability, our previous study found 80% 
and 70% agreement (within 1 titer) for repeat swine inﬂ  u-
enza (H1N2) and (H1N1) virus testing, respectively (6). 
Statistical Methods  
We examined a number of potential risk factors for as-
sociation with inﬂ  uenza virus infection outcomes: sex, age, 
inﬂ  uenza vaccination (human) history, seropositivity for 
human inﬂ  uenza viruses, years in swine production, days 
per week working with swine, use of personal protective 
equipment, recent swine exposure, number of pigs on the 
farm, and type of swine farm. HI test results from enroll-
ment serum samples were ﬁ  rst dichotomized with titers 
>40 considered as evidence of previous infection (15,16). 
The χ2 statistic or 2-sided Fisher exact test was used to ex-
amine bivariate risk factor associations. Age was examined 
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by using analysis of variance. Geometric mean HI titers 
were calculated for each virus strain. Titer distribution was 
compared with potential risk factors by using the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test with normal approximation. Afterwards, the 
distribution of antibody titer levels was examined for as-
sociations with multiple risk factors by using both uncon-
ditional logistic regression and proportional odds modeling 
(17). The score test was used to evaluate the proportional 
odds assumption. Final multivariable models were de-
signed by using a saturated model including all potential 
risk factors and manual backwards elimination. Analyses 
were performed by using SAS software version 9.1 (SAS 
Institute, Inc., Cary, NC, USA). 
We used bivariate and unconditional logistic regres-
sion to examine risk factors for evidence of inﬂ  uenza virus 
infection in 2 ways. First, using the classical approach, we 
examined risk factor associations for any 4-fold rise in HI 
titer (enrollment to 12 months, 12–24 months, or enroll-
ment to 24 months) against the swine inﬂ  uenza viruses in 
a binary logistic regression model. Next, we examined risk 
factors for any increase in HI titer (using the participants’ 
greatest increase in titers, enrollment to 12 months, 12–24 
months, or enrollment to 24 months) to the swine viruses 
through examining the entire spectrum of HI titer increase 
(e.g., no increase, 2-fold rise, 4-fold rise, 6-fold rise and 
8-fold rise) through proportional odds modeling. We have 
found the proportional odds method to have greater power 
to detect important risk factor associations than more com-
monly used binary (yes or no) outcomes (18).
Results
Among the 3,259 AHS persons contacted by tele-
phone or mailing, 1,274 (39.1%) were considered eligible 
and were willing to participate. Among these, 803 (63.0%) 
attended enrollment sessions, granted informed consent, 
and were enrolled. After excluding 15 persons who self-
reported accidental needle-stick with swine vaccine and an-
other person with missing exposure information, 707 par-
ticipants were classiﬁ  ed as AHS swine-exposed and 80 as 
AHS nonswine-exposed. Enrollment data were compared 
with 79 nonswine-exposed University of Iowa controls 
(Table 1). More AHS swine-exposed participants were 
male than female and they also were older than those in the 
other 2 groups. The AHS nonswine-exposed participants 
were primarily women (96.3%); among these, 75.5% were 
spouses of AHS swine-exposed participants. 
During the 24 months of follow-up, 6 of the enrolled 
study participants died and 4 withdrew from the study. 
Among the remaining 788 volunteers, 709 (90%) partici-
pated in the 12-month follow-up encounters (632 AHS 
swine-exposed and 77 AHS nonswine-exposed). Serum 
samples were drawn from 658. Similarly, among the 788 
AHS participants, 714 (91%) participated in the 24-month 
follow-up encounter (638 AHS swine-exposed, 75 AHS 
nonswine exposed). Serum samples were drawn from 654. 
Overall, 756 (96%) of 788 persons participated in at least 1 
follow-up encounter, and 726 (92.1%) consented and pro-
vided at least 2 serum specimens.
Self-Reported Exposures upon Enrollment
More than 50% of the participants reported receiving 
inﬂ  uenza vaccines during the 4 years before enrollment 
(Table 1). More than 90% of the AHS swine-exposed par-
ticipants had worked with swine for >10 years, and 90.0% 
reported living on a swine farm for >10 years.  Although 
AHS controls did not report direct swine exposure, 66.3% 
reported living on a swine farm, and 52.5% had done so for 
>10 years. Few participants had ever worked in the meat 
processing industry.
Seroprevalence Findings upon Enrollment
The distribution of HI titers against swine inﬂ  uenza 
virus subtypes H1N1 and H1N2 was different between 
groups. AHS swine-exposed participants had signiﬁ  cantly 
higher titers against swine inﬂ  uenza subtypes H1N1 (geomet-
ric mean/percentage >40 = 9.7/12.4%, 6.5/5.0%, 5.1/0.0%) 
and H1N2 (geometric mean/percentage >40 = 12.9/20.2%, 
7.5/6.3%, 5.6/1.3%), compared with AHS nonswine-
exposed participants and university controls, respectively.
At enrollment, for both initial unconditional logistic 
regression (data not shown), and proportional odds model-
ing (Table 2), AHS swine-exposed and AHS nonswine-ex-
posed participants had markedly higher distributions of an-
tibody titers against both swine inﬂ  uenza viruses compared 
to university controls. For example, against swine inﬂ  uenza 
(H1N1), AHS swine-exposed persons had an adjusted odds 
ratio (OR) of 54.9. Interestingly, AHS nonswine-exposed 
persons also were at increased risk compared with univer-
sity controls, with an adjusted OR of 28.2. Men had in-
creased adjusted odds of elevated titers against both swine 
viruses compared with women. Receiving a ﬂ  u shot in the 
past 4 years and having an antibody titer >40 against hu-
man inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus were important individual risk 
factors for elevated titers against swine inﬂ  uenza virus sub-
types H1N1 and H1N2, respectively.
Self-Reported Exposures and Illness
Among the 726 study participants who provided se-
rum samples in at least 1 follow-up encounter, 339 (46.7%) 
reported swine exposures during follow-up, 102 (14.0%) 
reporting never using gloves when working with animals, 
and 174 (24.0 %) worked with >400 pigs on a farm dur-
ing follow-up (online Appendix Table, available from 
http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/12/1871-appT.htm).
During the 24 months of follow-up, an inﬂ  uenza-like ill-
ness developed in 66 participants; they submitted 74 sets of 
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self-collected nasal and gargle swab specimens. On aver-
age, specimens were collected within 2.8 days of symptom 
onset (range 0–7 days) and were received at the laboratory 
within 1.8 days of collection (range 1–5 days). Two of the 
study participants were culture positive for inﬂ  uenza B vi-
rus, and 22 were real-time RT-PCR and culture positive for 
inﬂ  uenza A virus. The hemagglutination genes of 21 of the 
22 inﬂ  uenza A isolates were very similar to those from cir-
culating human inﬂ  uenza (H3N2) viruses. However, com-
plete genomic sequencing and phylogenetic analyses (data 
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Table 1. Characteristics of study participants at enrollment* 
Variables
AHS swine-exposed, no. (%), 
n = 707 
AHS nonswine-exposed, no. (%), 
n = 80 
University controls, no. (%), 
n = 79 
Sex† 
  Male   455 (64.4)  3 (3.8)  26 (32.9) 
  Female  252 (35.6)  77 (96.3)  53 (67.1) 
Age group, y 
  24–45  71 (10.0)  19 (23.8)  56 (70.9) 
  46–54  179 (25.3)  22 (27.5)  13 (16.5) 
  55–89  457 (64.6)  39 (48.8)  10 (12.7) 
 Mean  age‡  56 51.1 35.3
Received influenza vaccine in the past 4 y 
  Yes  392 (55.5)  43 (53.8)  44 (55.7) 
  No/unsure  315 (44.6)  37 (46.3)  35 (44.3) 
Swine influenza vaccine in 1976* 
  Yes  62 (8.8)  4 (5.0)  1 (1.3) 
  No  506 (71.6)  53 (66.3)  78 (98.7) 
  Unsure  132 (18.7)  22 (27.5)  0
  Missing  7 (1.0)  1 (1.3)  0
Currently work with nursery or finishing swine 
  Nursery swine  18 (2.6)  0 –
 Finishing  swine  126  (17.8)  0 –
 Both  168  (23.8)  0 –
  No  391 (55.3)  80 (100.0)  –
      Missing  4 (0.6)  0
Years worked in swine production 
 Never  0 76  (95.0)  –
 <1  1  (0.1)  0 –
 1–4  10  (1.4)  0 –
 5–10  38  (5.4)  0 –
 >10  650  (91.9)  0 –
  Missing  8 (1.1)  4 (5.0) 
On average, how often do you see or touch swine, other than the swine on the farm where you work? 
  Never  270 (38.2)  49 (61.3)  –
  Rarely  344 (48.7)  24 (30.0)  –
 Monthly  27  (3.8)  0 –
 Weekly  27  (3.8)  0 –
  Every day  14 (2.0)  1 (1.3)  –
  Missing  25 (3.5)  6 (7.5)  –
How long have you lived on this or other swine farm? 
  Never  15 (2.1)  18 (22.5)  –
  <1 y  1 (0.1)  1 (1.3)  –
  1–4 ys  4 (0.6)  2 (2.5)  –
  5–10 y  18 (2.6)  8 (10.0)  –
  >10 y  636 (90.0)  42 (52.5)  –
  Missing  33 (4.7)  9 (11.3)  –
Work in a slaughterhouse or meat processing plant 
  Yes  4 (0.6)  2 (2.5)  –
  No  674 (95.3)  75 (93.8)  –
  Missing  29 (4.1)  3 (3.8)  –
*AHS, Agricultural Health Study; AHS swine-exposed, participants from the A HS who reported working in swine production; AHS nonswine-exposed, 
participants from the AHS who denied ever working in swine production (96.3% female and among these females 75.5% were spouses of the AHS 
swine–exposed); university controls, faculty, staff, and students from the University of Iowa who denied ever working in swine production.  
†Statistically significant considering a 95% confidence level by Fisher exact test for the 3 groups. 
‡Statistically significant considering a 95% confidence level by analysis of variance test for the 3 groups. Swine Workers and Swine Inﬂ  uenza Virus
not shown) of 1 isolate (A/Iowa/CEID23/05) showed that 
this virus was a “triple reassortant” inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus 
(GenBank accession nos. DQ889682-DQ889689), with H1 
HA, N1 NA, M, NP, and NS genes of classic swine in-
ﬂ  uenza virus lineage, PB1 gene of human inﬂ  uenza virus 
lineage, and PA and PB2 genes of avian inﬂ  uenza virus 
lineage. Viruses of this genotype emerged among US swine 
in the late 1990s (19) following prior emergence of related 
human/swine/avian triple reassortant H3N2 and H1N2 sub-
types among American pigs (9–11,20,21). 
Participant with Swine Inﬂ  uenza A Infection and Illness
The participant whose specimens yielded A/Iowa/
CEID23/05 was a 50-year-old man who lived on a swine 
farm and was currently working with nursery and ﬁ  nishing 
swine. He self-reported having a sore throat, cough, runny/
stuffed nose, and a measured oral temperature of 38.2°C 
at the time of culture. No headache, red/itchy eyes, body 
aches, chills, diarrhea, nausea/vomiting, or hoarseness 
were reported. He also reported exposure to sick swine 
(with symptoms of cough, runny nose, and/or poor food 
intake) during the 10 days before his illness. The isolation 
of A/Iowa/CEID23/2005, together with the prior recovery 
of genotypically related reassortant inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) and 
(H3N2) viruses from 2 people following apparent zoonotic 
transmission from pigs (22,23), indicates that viruses of hu-
man/swine/avian triple reassortant genotype can be human 
pathogens.
Evidence for Inﬂ  uenza Infections during Follow-up
Like the enrollment serum samples, the 12-month and 
24-month follow-up samples showed geometric mean ti-
ters that were elevated for the AHS swine-exposed com-
pared with the AHS nonswine-exposed participants against 
swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) viruses (12 months 10.05, 7.18; 24 
months 16.60, 8.71) and (H1N2) (12 months 11.64, 7.84; 
24 months 10.14, 7.21). Although study participants’ sera 
were obtained at 12-month intervals and some infections 
were likely missed, we found considerable statistically sig-
niﬁ  cant evidence for recent inﬂ  uenza virus infection. Con-
sidering the 726 participants who donated serum at least 
twice and after examining each serum pair (enrollment to 
12 months, 12 to 24 months, and enrollment to 24 months), 
180 participants (25%) showed a >4-fold rise in antibod-
ies against swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus, 37 (5%) against 
swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N2) virus, and 32 (4%) against human 
inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus at some time during the 24 months 
of follow-up (Table 3). There was more serologic activity 
against swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) during the 12- to 24-month 
follow-up period. However, among these same participants 
with rises in antibody titers, relatively few self-reported 
having inﬂ  uenza-like illness during the 24-month study pe-
riod (Table 3).
After the paired serum samples were examined over 
time, AHS swine-exposed participants showed an increased 
risk for infection with swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus com-
pared with AHS nonswine-exposed participants during the 
follow-up period (online Appendix Table; OR 2.6, 95% 
conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 1.3–5.4). However, identifying the 
speciﬁ  c exposure during follow-up that caused this increase 
in risk was elusive. We examined glove use, direct swine 
exposure during follow-up, the number of pigs exposed to 
during follow-up, and the type of direct swine exposure 
(nursery and ﬁ  nishing), as well as a history of inﬂ  uenza 
(human) vaccination and serologic changes in antibodies 
against human H1 inﬂ  uenza viruses. Although there were 
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Table 2. Odds ratios for elevated hemagglutination inhibition assay antibodies (enrollment sera) against swine influenza virus using
proportional odds modeling  
Swine (H1N1)  Swine (H1N2) 
Variables n
Unadjusted OR  
(95% CI) 
Adjusted OR† 
(95% CI) 
Unadjusted OR  
(95% CI) 
Adjusted OR†
(95% CI) 
AHS swine-exposed  707 35.8 (8.7–146.8)  54.9 (13.0–232.6)  17.2 (7.9–37.7)  13.5 (6.1-29.7) 
AHS nonswine-exposed  80 10.6 (2.4–47.5)  28.2 (6.1–130.1)  4.7 (1.9–11.4)  6.9 (2.8-17.2) 
University controls  79 Ref Ref Ref Ref
Age continuous  866 1.00 (0.99–1.01)  0.97 (0.96–0.98)  1.02 (1.01–1.03)  –
Sex 
  Male  484 3.7 (2.8–4.9)  3.3 (2.4–4.5)  3.5 (2.7–4.5)  3.0 (2.3-4.0) 
 Female  382 Ref Ref Ref Ref
Received flu shot in the past 4 y 
    Yes  479 1.0 (0.8–1.3)  1.4 (1.1–1.9)  1.3 (1.0–1.7)  –
    No/unsure  387 Ref Ref Ref –
Human influenza (H1N1) (titer >40) 
    Positive  347 1.1 (0.9–1.4)  – 1.6 (1.2–2.0)  1.8 (1.4-2.4) 
    Negative  519 Ref – Ref Ref
*OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; AHS, Agricultural Health Study; AHS swine-exposed, participants from the AHS who reported working in swine 
production; AHS nonswine-exposed, participants from the AHS who denied ever working in swine production, 94% were spouses of AHS swine-exposed; 
university controls, faculty, staff, and students from the University of Iowa who denied ever working in swine production. 
†Final multivariable models were designed that used a saturated model including all potential risk factors (see methods) and manual backwards 
elimination. RESEARCH
suggestions that these exposure variables were important, 
male sex was the strongest independent predictor of a 4-
fold or any increase in titer over time. Similar analyses for 
increased titers against the swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N2) virus 
and stratiﬁ  cations of data by sex also failed to implicate a 
speciﬁ  c swine exposure as etiologic (data not shown).
Discussion
Humans, pigs, and avian species are inextricably 
linked in inﬂ  uenza transmission. The 1918, 1957, and 1968 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza viruses all had structural components 
from an avian inﬂ  uenza virus (24). During the 1918 pan-
demic, a concomitant epizootic of swine inﬂ  uenza spread 
across the US Midwest (4). Numerous anecdotal accounts 
described inﬂ   uenza-like illnesses developing in farmers 
and their families after contact with ill swine and of swine 
developing symptoms of swine inﬂ  uenza after contact with 
ill farmers (3). Since the 1918 pandemic, human inﬂ  uenza 
viruses have infected swine (25,26) and swine inﬂ  uenza vi-
ruses have occasionally caused recognized disease among 
humans (27). Swine inﬂ  uenza transmission is known to oc-
cur nonseasonally and sporadically in the US swine popu-
lation. Approximately 25%–33% of 6- to 7-month-old ﬁ  n-
ishing pigs and 45% of breeding pigs have antibodies to the 
classic swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus (28,29). Anticipating 
that the next pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus may be efﬁ  ciently 
transmitted from swine to swine and between swine and 
humans, we examined risk factors for previous and inci-
dent swine inﬂ  uenza virus infections in humans as surro-
gates for pandemic virus risk among those occupationally 
exposed to swine.
Study results suggest that swine workers are at mark-
edly increased risk for swine inﬂ  uenza virus infections. 
Swine workers (AHS swine-exposed) had >50 times the 
odds of elevated antibodies against the classic swine in-
ﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus and remarkably, the AHS nonswine-
exposed (mostly spouses of swine-exposed participants) 
also were at increased risk, with >25 times the odds of in-
ﬂ  uenza (H1N1) infection compared with truly nonexposed 
controls (university controls). These ratios suggest that the 
AHS nonswine-exposed participants acquired infection 
either through indirect exposure to swine (e.g., handling 
dirty laundry or exposure to other fomites), misclassiﬁ  ca-
tion (did not report direct contact with swine but did oc-
casionally enter a swine barn), or exposure to their spouses 
who were shedding swine inﬂ  uenza viruses. Although the 
latter explanation is likely a rare event, even spouses who 
reported never living on a swine farm had increased odds 
of elevated antibody titers (data not shown). These ﬁ  ndings 
should be tempered with the acknowledgment that labora-
tory-based evidence for human-to-human transmission of 
swine inﬂ  uenza viruses is sparse in medical literature.
Consistent with our previous report (7), among the 
signiﬁ  cant unadjusted risk factors, we found exposure to 
nursery pigs was associated with an increase in antibody 
titer over time to swine inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) virus (online Ap-
pendix Table; OR 1.5, 95% CI 1.1–2.1), but being male 
was a stronger predictor. Among the participants who 
seroconverted to >1 of the swine viruses, <25% reported 
an inﬂ  uenza-like illness during the 2 years of follow-up, 
which suggested that most swine inﬂ  uenza virus infections 
are mild or subclinical. Among the 66 study participants 
with inﬂ  uenza-like illness who submitted 74 sets of gargle 
or nasal swab specimens through the US postal system, 22 
cultures showed inﬂ  uenza A virus and 1 (4.5%) showed 
swine inﬂ  uenza virus. 
This study has a number of limitations. Participation 
was voluntary, and participants might have been more likely 
to suffer zoonoses than their peers. Exposure data were col-
lected through self-report, were unveriﬁ  ed, and were subject 
to recall and other biases. University controls were younger 
than AHS participants and had substantially fewer years of 
life to come in contact with inﬂ  uenza viruses. Although age 
was selected in only 1 of the ﬁ  nal multivariable models (Ta-
ble 2), we checked for age difference confounding by forc-
ing age in each of the other ﬁ  nal multiviariate models, and 
the covariates presented in Tables 2 and 3 remained statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant (data not shown). As the study HI assays are 
strain dependent, a mismatch between circulating human or 
swine strains and those we used for the assays could have 
resulted in inaccurate estimates of risk. 
Additionally, there was likely some confounding ef-
fect on antibodies against human inﬂ  uenza virus reacting in 
the HI assays against swine inﬂ  uenza virus. We attempted 
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Table 3. Serologic evidence for influenza infections during the 24 months of follow-up 
>4-fold increase 
Swine influenza (H1N1)  Swine influenza (H1N2)  Human influenza (H1N1) 
Period N n
Reported ILI,* 
n (%)  n
Reported ILI,*  
n (%)  n
Reported ILI,* 
n (%) 
Enrollment to 12-mo follow-up   658 26 3 (11.5)  17 7 (41.2)  10 1 (10) 
12- to 24--mo follow-up  586 109 18 (16.5)  16 2 (12.5)  19 3 (15.8) 
Enrollment to 24-mo follow-up  654 141 31 (22)  23 2 (8.7)  20 3 (15) 
Any increase between pairs of 
serum samples†  726 180 38 (21.1)  37 9 (24.3)  32 4 (12.5) 
*Percentage of the participants who demonstrated a  4-fold increase in titer who also self-reported an influenza-like illness (ILI) during follow–up.  
†From enrollment to 12 mo, 12 to 24 mo, or enrollment to 24 mo, among participants who permitted serum sample collections at least 2 times during the 
study. Swine Workers and Swine Inﬂ  uenza Virus
to control for potential cross-reactivity through statistical 
adjustments. However, these and the other demographic 
risk factor adjustments could have been inadequate to iso-
late swine exposure risk factors. Further, our detection of 
incident inﬂ  uenza virus infections was suboptimal. Paired 
sera were collected 12 months apart, which likely permitted 
some inﬂ  uenza virus infection to be missed. Also, because 
of the wide dispersal of study participants, we relied upon 
self-identiﬁ  cation of inﬂ  uenza-like illness, self-collection 
of nasal and gargle specimens, and shipping of specimens 
by the US postal system, all likely reducing the probabil-
ity of identifying inﬂ  uenza virus infections. Even so, we 
detected both serologic and culture evidence of incident 
swine inﬂ  uenza virus infections. This study is unique in that 
a large cohort of rural farmers, many with swine exposures, 
were prospectively followed for inﬂ  uenza-like illnesses. 
The aggregate study data clearly documents increased oc-
cupational risk of swine inﬂ  uenza virus infection for these 
workers and their nonswine-exposed spouses.
As our study data suggest, swine inﬂ  uenza virus in-
fections in humans are often mild or subclinical; however, 
when detected they can be quite serious. Myers et al. re-
cently reviewed the 50 cases in the medical literature and 
found the overall case-fatality rate to be 14% (27). Human 
clinical morbidity and mortality rates would likely be in-
creased if a pandemic virus’s effect on rural communities 
were ampliﬁ  ed by infection in swine herds. Thus, our data 
have important public health implications. With risk for 
infection so high and exposure so common, swine work-
ers should be considered for special public health interven-
tions (1). To our knowledge, there is no US national or state 
policy that offers swine workers priority access to annual 
inﬂ  uenza vaccines, pandemic vaccines, or inﬂ  uenza antivi-
rals as part of inﬂ  uenza pandemic planning. These workers 
are also not considered a high priority for inﬂ  uenza surveil-
lance efforts. 
Protecting swine workers from inﬂ  uenza viruses will 
also beneﬁ  t those with whom they have contact, namely 
family members, as well as the swine herds for which they 
care. Assuming an inﬂ  uenza virus may readily move among 
and between species, recent modeling studies have shown 
that such workers could accelerate an inﬂ  uenza epidemic 
among nonswine workers in their communities as much as 
86% (30). Additionally, there is now extensive evidence 
for human inﬂ  uenza virus reassortment with swine and/or 
avian viruses in pigs (9–11,19–21,25,26). Encouraging 
swine workers to receive annual inﬂ  uenza vaccines will 
reduce their potential role in the genesis of novel inﬂ  uenza 
strains. Our study results corroborate the numerous argu-
ments (1) that protecting swine workers from human and 
zoonotic inﬂ  uenza makes good public health sense. 
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